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Abstract: In this study, we look at two interpretive puzzles associated with the 
thought of Avicenna that are still of intrinsic philosophical interest today. The 
first concerns to what extent, if at all, Avicenna’s deity can be said to act freely. 
The second concerns to what extent, if at all, humans within Avicenna’s philo-
sophical system can be said to act freely. It is our contention that only through a 
careful analysis of Avicenna’s theory of action can one begin to assess his posi-
tion concerning the status of the will and so provide a satisfactory response to 
these two interpretative issues. We hope to show that Avicenna can account for 
divine freedom and that, at least in the case of prophets and sages, humans too 
are capable of free action.
1 Introduction: History and Historiography
In this study we look at two interpretive puzzles associated with the thought 
of Avicenna (980–1037), puzzles that are still of intrinsic philosophical interest 
today. One involves Avicenna’s philosophical theology, while the other is central 
to his psychology and ethics. Both issues, it will be seen, involve Avicenna’s con-
ception of the will and what counts as a voluntary and even perhaps free action. 
It is our contention that only through a careful analysis of Avicenna’s theory of 
action can one begin to assess his position concerning the status of the will and 
so provide satisfactory responses to the two interpretative issues to which we now 
turn.¹
1 A full account of Avicenna’s theory of the will would also require discussions of (1) his “politi-
cal theory”, that is, an account of the role of human society in human perfection and (2) the place 
of the Shari‘a, that is, religious law, and/or natural law in human moral development. Unfortu-
nately, it is beyond the scope of the present article to cover these additional issues, although we 
hope to treat them in a separate study.
Anthony Ruffus/Jon McGinnis: Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, 599 Lucas Hall 
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The first puzzle, in brief, begins with Avicenna’s insistence that divinity is 
immutable and impassible. As such, reasons Avicenna, the deity cannot come 
to have some will that it has not had from all eternity, for this would be a type 
of change. Next, Avicenna argues that whenever there is a complete cause, the 
concomitant effect of that cause must come to be simultaneous with the cause.² 
Now the divine will, power and knowledge are the complete cause for the exist-
ence of the world, and these are again unchanging. Consequently, Avicenna con-
cludes, because God has existed from all eternity, God must have been causing 
the existence of, that is, creating, the world from all eternity. Responding to this 
argument, no less than the great Muslim theologians al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) and 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) as well as the Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas 
(d. 1274) raise the first puzzle: Avicenna’s argument eliminates divine volition in 
any meaningful sense and renders the creative act no different than a matter of 
natural necessity.³ In other words, Avicenna’s deity appears to be no different 
than a natural force like gravity and so hardly worthy of worship.
The second interpretative puzzle concerns reconciling Avicenna’s apparently 
strong causal determinism as found in his metaphysics and natural philosophy 
with his occasional ethical claims that humans are morally responsible for their 
own actions and in fact can change their moral temperaments. Thus some schol-
ars such as Goichon, Gardet, Hourani, Marmura, Frank, Michot and Belo, focus-
ing on Avicenna’s physical and metaphysical writings, see Avicenna as a deter-
minist.⁴ Others such as Ivry, Goodman and Janssens (and, to an extent, Rashed) 
make Avicenna an advocate of free will (or at least suggest that there is room for 
free will in his system).⁵ Still others simply label him a compatibilist.⁶ Since on at 
least certain conceptions of determinism and free will, the two notions are incom-
2 See Avicenna 1957–1960, V. 8; Avicenna 2005, IX.1 [4] and Avicenna 2009, III.11 [2].
3 See al-Ghazālī 2000, Disputation 3; Rāzī, in Avicenna 1957–1960, V. 3, 69–71; Aquinas 1965, 
III.4. More recently, see Zedler 1948, 105–59; Gilson 1955, 213; Leaman 1999, 44, and Kafrawi 2007, 
179–191. See Druart 2006 for an excellent account of al-Ghazālī’s formulation of this problem and 
his own theory of agency. For a view that denies that Avicenna’s God creates of natural necessity, 
see Acar 2005, Chapter 3. A more recent discussion of this issue can be found in Kalin 2010, and 
although Kalin’s focus is primarily on the creation account of Mullā Ṣadrā, in his section “Vo li-
tion versus Necessity”, he suggests that what he terms the necessitarian and libertarian views 
have more in common than previously has been appreciated.
4 See Goichon 1937, 162–3; Gardet 1954–5, esp. 828–31; for Hourani, see Avicenna 1966b, 25–48; 
Marmura 1984, 172–87; Frank 1992, 23–4; Michot 1986, 61–4 and Belo 2007, Chapter 3 and Con-
clusion.
5 Ivry 1984, 160–71; Goodman 2006, 81; Janssens 2006b and Rashed 2000, 223–57.
6 McGinnis 2010, 225.
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patible, the second puzzle is to see how Avicenna understands these notions and 
whether he is committed to both and, if so, how he reconciles them.
Both problems have their historical origin in the Greek philosophical world 
as well as their counterparts during the formative period of Islamic theology. Con-
sequently, getting a general idea of the historical setting and how contemporary 
scholars have seen Avicenna responding to that background provides a nice in -
troduction to Avicenna’s philosophy of action.
The first puzzle, namely that God must create of necessity given his nature, 
was already of concern at the time of Plotinus (204/5–270), who took up the issue 
in Ennead, VI.8, a treatise dedicated to free will and the will of the One.⁷ It is 
not clear whether this section of the Enneads made it into Arabic or if it is only 
missing from what has survived.⁸ Whatever the case, Avicenna certainly knew 
most of the elements in it and the general strategy of this treatise, namely, that 
only by understanding the divine will can one understand lesser wills, like the 
human will, that are imperfect reflections of the divine will. As for the issue of the 
divinity’s purported lack of freedom, Plotinus’s general response is that as God is 
absolutely simple, there is no nature in God that forces him to create.⁹
This issue of the relation between God’s simplicity and divine attributes, 
like will, knowledge, power and creating, was also at the fore of one of the more 
heated discussions among Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn), namely, the on-
tological status of divine attributes (ṣifāt).¹⁰ In general, the mutakallimūn agreed 
that the Qurʼan ascribes two different types of attributes to God: the attributes of 
the essence (ṣifāt al-dhāt) and the attributes of action (sifāt al-fi‘l). Attributes of 
the essence, like being alive, powerful and knowing, are credited to God from all 
eternity simply owing to what God is. There is a sense, then, that these attributes 
are necessary attributes of God. Attributes of action, like his creating or being 
merciful, in contrast, are credited to God on account of his actions. These attrib-
utes are in a sense contingent in that God has, as it were, a choice concerning 
whether to act or not. In other words, although it would be a contradiction to 
say that God exists but is not alive (an attribute of the essence), there is no corre-
sponding contradiction in saying that God exists but is not creating (an attribute 
of action) or even that God never creates.
7 For excellent discussions of this text, see Rist 1967, Chapter 6 and Frede 2011, 130–52.
8 Adamson 2002, 157–9. As both Enneads, VI.7 and VI.9, were translated, there is reason to think 
that if our section was not translated, at least the content would have been known, perhaps 
through an oral tradition going back to the Kindī circle.
9 Enneads, VI.8.7.
10 An excellent introduction to the issue is found in D. Gimaret’s article in Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. ‘Ṣifāt’.
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Where theologians differed concerned the ontological status of the divine 
attributes. The orthodox Sunnī position, most commonly associated with 
al-Māturīdī¹¹ (853–944) and al-Ash‘arī¹² (874–936), was based upon their reading 
of the Qurʼan. These thinkers viewed the attributes as being real subsisting things 
in the entity or essence (dhāt) that is God. Thus, for these theologians, God is living 
through a life that is in him or God is knowing through a knowledge that is in him. 
In contrast, certain rationalist theologians, known as the Mu‘tazilites, maintained 
that the divine attributes are best understood as mere descriptors of God, usually 
having no greater ontological significance than names for or words said of God.
The specific debate arose over the implications of one’s understanding of the 
divine attributes with respect to God’s simplicity or unity or uniqueness (tawḥīd). 
Again both groups of theologians agreed that from all eternity God must be 
described by the attributes of the essence and that these descriptions are caused 
by their corresponding attributes. Additionally, recall that the Sunnī theologi-
ans were committed to the position that there eternally exists in God a knowl-
edge, power and, at the very least, any remaining attributes of the essence and 
that all of these are real subsisting things. As a result, observed the Mu‘tazilites, 
the Sunnī theologians are committed to the existence of a plurality of eternals; 
however, continue the Mu‘tazilites, the defining characteristic of divinity is being 
eternal. Consequently, the Sunnī position, so concluded the Mu‘tazilites, leads 
to a plurality of deities, which directly contradicts either the unity or uniqueness 
of God.
Avicenna, as one will see, in some sense agrees with the Mu‘tazilites in insist-
ing on the importance of divine simplicity and unity, and in some sense agrees 
with certain orthodox theologians in denying that eternity is the defining trait of 
divinity. Where he fundamentally disagrees with both sides is in the claim that 
some of the divine attributes hold of God only contingently. For Avicenna, all 
divine attributes are, in a sense, of the essence and are merely various ways that 
we, from our limited standpoint, describe the one and absolutely simple attrib-
ute of Necessary Existence.¹³ Consequently, both groups of theologians can com-
plain against Avicenna, “Is it not the case that this Necessary Existent must create 
solely on account of what it is, and so has no freedom not to create?”
The second problem about human freedom likewise occurs within the 
context of early Islamic theological debates and again concerns the divine attrib-
utes. The issue now is how to reconcile God’s power (qadar) with his justice (‘adl). 
11 For a discussion of Mātūrīdī’s theology, see Rudolph 1997.
12 For a discussion of Ash‘arī’s theology, see Gimaret 1990.
13 Avicenna 2005, VIII.4, esp. 2.
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The notion of qadar is also associated with destiny or fate, and in the Qurʼan one 
often reads of God’s destining or determining events, as, for example:
As for the unbelievers – whether you have warned them or not it is the same – they do not 
believe. God has set a seal on their hearts and on their hearing and over their vision is a veil. 
There awaits for them a mighty punishment. (2.5–6)
In light of verses like this one and more, al-Ash‘arī and many of his followers 
took divine power to entail divine preordination. Similarly, the jurist Abū Ḥanifa, 
the inspiration for the theological system of Māturīdī, is reported to have said: 
“What reaches you (of evil) could not possibly have missed you, and what misses 
you could not possibly have reached you.” Despite what might appear as hard 
determinism, some of these theologians attempted to develop a form of compat-
ibilism, as perhaps seen in the Ash‘arite theory of ‘acquisition’ (kasb), and par-
ticularly in the post-Avicennan articulation of that theory by Ash‘arites such as 
al-Ghazālī.¹⁴ There is also the compatibilism of Māturīdī, who held that while all 
human actions are created by God and so subject to his will, humans still act 
by choice (ikhtiyār), and that human’s power, given by God, is valid for opposite 
acts.¹⁵ Still, as a general rule for orthodox theologians, even compatibilists, the 
omniscience of God literally means all power is reserved for God and God alone.
Certain Mu‘tazilites objected to this position, even in its compatibilist forms, 
complaining that it would make a mockery of God’s justice.¹⁶ According to these 
thinkers, God could only justly reward or punish us for our actions on the assump-
tion that we choose to act virtuously or viciously. The Qurʼan, however, explicitly 
claims that God will judge us for our actions and that God is just. Accordingly, 
whereas Mu‘tazilites could accept that all non-human actions in the world were 
destined or determined, humans must have the power to choose when it comes to 
right and wrong actions, that is, actions worthy of praise or blame. In other words, 
according to certain Mu‘tazilites, moral responsibility requires human freedom, 
where ‘freedom’ is understood in the libertarian sense of the agent’s being able to 
do otherwise or having the power to choose between alternative actions.¹⁷
14 See the excellent studies of Marmura 1994 and Druart 2006 as well as a comparison of the 
Ash‘arite theory of acquisition and Stoic compatibilism in López-Farjeat 2007.
15 See Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. ‘Māturīdī’.
16 See Wolfson 1976, VIII.ii, esp. 616 f. und Hourani 1985, Chapter 6.
17 While it is notoriously difficult to provide primary references for the beliefs of the earli-
est Mut‘azilites, there are still indications that some held a libertarian view of freedom. Thus 
al-Ash‘arī mentions certain Mu‘tazilites’ view of obedience and disobedience in his Maqālāt 
al-Islāmīyīn (al-Ash‘arī 2005, 352), noting that for them obedience and disobedience belong to 
the same genus (jins) and are like two motions with respect to a single direction, as upward and 
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Of course the issue of moral responsibility was also treated among Greek phi-
losophers whose works were translated into Arabic, and so had an influence on 
Avicenna’s understanding. Certainly one of the more important of these is Aristot-
le’s own treatment of the voluntary (Gk. hekousion; Ar. taw‘) and (deliberate) choice 
(Gk. prohaeresis; Ar. ikhtiyār)¹⁸ in Nicomachean Ethics, III.1–5 (and the supplemen-
tary discussion in De anima, III.9–12).¹⁹ Two quick points to note. First, for Aristotle, 
something is voluntary if (1) it is not done by force, and (2) it is not done through 
(dia) ignorance; as such, to act voluntarily applies equally to brutes, children and 
morally responsible adults. Second, the problem of reconciling moral responsibil-
ity and some form of determinism would not have been as pressing for Aristotle, as 
Aristotle’s philosophical system may well have been indeterministic or at the very 
least allowed for non-necessitated (even if perhaps caused) events.²⁰
This situation changes with the Stoics. Virtually all ancient philosophers 
agreed that if determinism and voluntary action, with its accompanying notion of 
moral responsibility, truly are incompatible, so much the worse for determinism. 
Thus the problem becomes acute for the Stoics, since for them all things are deter-
mined and governed by a universal nature, providence and Fate (heimarmenē) 
and cannot be but as they are or will be.²¹ Yet, Stoics continued, this cosmic sym-
pathy (sumpatheia) or determinism embraces actions that are “up to us”.
downward are with respect to rectilinear motion. The sense of the text is that just as something 
that can go upward must also be able to go downward, so likewise if someone can be obedi-
ent, so must he be able to be disobedient. A near Mu‘tazilite contemporary of Avicenna, ‘Abd 
al-Jabbār, also had a robust understanding of freedom, which certainly can be interpreted in 
libertarian terms (see Hourani 1971, esp. § 35). A later source is al-Ghazālī and his analysis of will 
(irāda) in the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Discussion 1 (al-Ghazālī 2000, 223  f.). In that work 
al-Ghazālī analyzes the will as the power to discern among indiscernibles, that is, to choose from 
alternative possibilities without any of the possible objects of will necessarily forcing the choice. 
This final source should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt, as al-Ghazālī is not necessarily 
presenting his own view, although Ṭūsī shortly after al-Ghazālī ascribes the view to the “modern 
mutakallimīn” (Avicenna 1957–1960, 105–108). Secondary literature is more forthcoming. See, for 
example, Hourani 1971, passim, and 1985, Ch. 6; Watt 1973, 232–243, and Wolfson 1976, VIII; there 
is also useful, but indirect, information in Cook 2003, Ch. 4, where he discusses the efficacy of 
commanding the good.
18 Interestingly, the Arabic irāda is not the preferred translation for either prohaeresis or boulē-
sis in the Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics, even though it is used to translate both 
terms in non-technical contexts. See Aristotle 2005, Graeco-Arabic Glossary, s.v. ‘boulēsis’ and 
‘prohaeresis’.
19 Studies of Aristotle’s theory of action include Sorabji 1980, Charles 1984 and Coope 2010, 
with the most detailed discussion of Aristotle’s theory of the voluntary being found in Charles 
1984, Ch. 2.
20 See Sorabji 1980, esp. Part I and II.
21 The following is a composite presentation of various Stoic views. As such, not all details are 
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Aristotle had introduced the notion of “up to us” (Gk. eph hēmin; Ar. ilaynā)²² 
in his discussion of moral responsibility (Nicomachean Ethics: III.5); however, it 
is not clear whether Aristotle understands being “up to us” as applying only to 
morally responsible adults; for in Nicomachean Ethics: V.8, he characterizes the 
voluntary as what is up to us, which again applies equally to brutes and small 
children.²³ In contrast, in the Stoics’ analysis of voluntary actions, “up to us” 
indicates a truly human factor, namely, our ‘assent’ (sunkatathesis) to the action. 
Thus, for an action to be voluntary, such that we are morally responsible for it, 
it must be up to us in the sense that we assent to that action. The Stoics now 
have the means to show how their causal determinism is compatible with moral 
responsibility. As one’s assent is part of the world order, it too is a constituent of 
the causal nexus determining one’s action. In other words, whereas it is true that 
things cannot go other than according to the causal order determined by Fate, 
that determined order is not, as it were, imposed upon us from without heed-
less of our mental states, attitudes and assent, but includes those causal factors 
internal to us, and so includes factors that are up to us. Consequently, in that we 
assent to these actions we are morally responsible for them.
Works by the Stoics were not translated into Arabic, but Alexander of Aph-
rodisias preserved much of the Stoic position in his De Fato, which was available 
in Arabic.²⁴ Thus, it may have been a source for Avicenna’s own conceptions of 
human moral responsibility and determinism. In the De Fato, Alexander levels 
a critique against Stoic compatibilism in which he formulates a strong libertar-
ian condition on what counts as freedom (to eleutheron) and moral responsibil-
ity. In Nicomachean Ethics, III.2, Aristotle himself had distinguished voluntary 
actions that might belong to young children and brute animals, from properly 
human actions that are through (deliberate) choice (prohaeresis). Choice itself 
is a species of voluntary action, with voluntary action as its genus and result-
ing from a rational process of deliberation (Gk bouleusis, Ar. rawīya) as its differ-
ence. Alexander insists on this distinction and uses it to characterize “up to us”. 
Something is up to us, says Alexander, if in addition to involving assent, it also is 
true for each individual philosopher. Still, it does provide the general contours of the Stoics’ 
beliefs. For more detailed discussions of Stoic providence, see Bobzien 1998 and Baltzly 2003.
22 Ilaynā is found in the Arabic translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, but it is not clear that 
this locution is the only way that the notion was expressed in Arabic. See Avicenna’s use of ‘an 
dhātihi and munāsab below.
23 See Coope 2010, 441  f.
24 See López-Farjeat 2007 for a discussion of the similarities between Alexander’s De Fato and 
the corresponding discussion in the medieval Islamic world.
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according to reason and selection (kata logon te kai krisin).²⁵ A truly free human 
action, then, requires selection and, so, alternatives. Thus, Alexander concludes 
his philosophical analysis with these words, “[…] we say [being up to us] is owing 
to our having the power for opposite actions.”²⁶ For Alexander, like the Mu‘ta-
zilites after him, moral responsibility requires having the power rationally to 
choose between alternatives.
With Alexander’s analysis of “up to us”, we come full circle back to Plotinus’s 
discussion of free will in Enneads, VI.8. Like those before him, Plotinus under-
stands a free action as one that not only is voluntary but also is up to us. Again, 
following Aristotle, Plotinus understands voluntary in terms of (1) an agent’s re-
cognizing what it is doing and (2) no physical factors forcing the agent to act. As 
for what is up to us, for Plotinus, appetites, like hunger, and emotions, like fear, 
are not up to us, precisely because they are rooted in physiological factors outside 
of our control; one does not voluntarily become hungry or afraid, for example. 
For an action then to be up to us, we must have mastery over it, that is, what we 
desire must come about solely because we willed for it to come to be. For Plotinus, 
such an act of the will (boulēsis) requires that the very desire has its source in our 
rational part, that is, our intellect. Unlike Alexander, then, who emphasized the 
sense of selection inherent in Aristotle’s notion of prohaeresis, Plotinus empha-
sizes the rational component. Again, although it is not clear whether Plotinus’s 
Enneads, VI.8 was available in Arabic, Avicenna will virtually reproduce Ploti-
nus’s account but with elements of his own.
As for Avicenna’s own account of determinism and freedom, it, again, has 
been the subject of competing interpretations. Before turning to some of those 
interpretations, however, we should note that for the purposes of this paper, we 
assume the following working definition of determinism: Some thing e (whether 
an event or agent) is determined just in case the existence of e is causally neces-
sitated. Here it is important to note that the cause that necessitates e’s existence 
need not be either different from e (so as not to preclude a self-necessitating 
entity) or antecedent to e. (We return to Avicenna’s notion of causal necessity in 
the sequel.)
Given this definition of determinism, it is fair to say that the most natural or 
at least most common interpretation of Avicenna’s modal metaphysics and theory 
of emanation is of one that gives rise to a deterministic system in which every 
event and entity is in some way necessary. Again, it was in this way that Goichon, 
Gardet, Hourani, Marmura, Frank, Michot and Belo all read Avicenna, and so 
25 Alexander 1983, XIV, 183.27–29.
26 Alexander 1983, XXXVIII, 211.27–29.
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labeled him a determinist. This reading may be called the Standard Interpreta-
tion of Avicenna’s philosophical system. Although we accept the Standard Inter-
pretation, we also feel that it is incomplete, for it frequently leaves unexplained 
Avicenna’s occasional talk of volitional and even free acts by God and humans. 
More often than not, scholars either simply ignore this issue or acknowl edge it 
but then do not take it up. So, for instance, in Chance and Determinism in Avi-
cenna and Averroes, Belo recognizes that there is “ethical determinism, or the 
determinism of the human action,” but explicitly excludes it from her otherwise 
excellent study.²⁷
A few scholars address the issue but usually by interpreting away the trou-
bling passages. For example, Hourani in his highly informative analysis of Avi-
cenna’s treatise Essay on the Secret of Destiny takes up the issue of reconciling 
Avicenna’s determinism with his claim of moral responsibility. For Hourani, 
Avicenna achieves this reconciliation by reinterpreting reward and punishment. 
“[W]hat are described as the ‘Rewards’ and ‘Punishments’ of the other life are 
in fact the inevitable effects of the soul’s own behaviour in the present life.”²⁸ 
In other words, God can be exculpated for ‘rewarding and punishing’ us in the 
hereafter, because there is no causal break between us in the here-and-now and 
us there-and-then. Whatever we experience, whether here or there, is nothing 
more than the necessary effects of a causal series that begins with our actions 
here on Earth.
Unfortunately, Hourani’s Avicenna does not appear to have resolved the 
seeming conflict between God’s justice and his destining all actions. The Mu‘ta-
zilites can rightly complain that such a position comes down to the following 
conditional: If we are morally responsible for our actions in the present life, then 
we are morally responsible for the consequences of those actions in the afterlife. 
Of course, the Mu‘tazilites are simply going to deny the antecedent, namely that, 
one can be held morally responsible at all for one’s actions, given determinism. 
Hence, the analysis comes to naught. Our hope in this study is to go beyond the 
Standard Interpretation by exploring what resources Avicenna has for reconcil-
ing freedom and moral responsibility with his determinism.
As for those who have challenged the Standard Interpretation, they have 
done so from one of two directions: either, (1), they offer an alternative (indeter-
ministic) reading of Avicenna’s metaphysics or, (2), they appeal to non-metaphy-
sical Avicennan texts, such as works on ethics, religion or politics in which Avi-
cenna appears committed to free will and moral responsibility.
27 Belo 2007, 4–7.
28 Hourani 1966, 40.
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As for offering a reading other than the Standard Interpretation, Avicenna’s 
modal metaphysics has two key components, either one of which has been re-
interpreted so as to allow for indeterminism. These components are Avicenna’s 
understanding of necessary existence (wājib al-wujūd) and of possible existence 
(mumkin al-wujūd). Ivry has taken up Avicenna’s notion of possible existence, 
whereas Goodman has turned his eyes to necessary existence. Although we 
cannot offer an exhaustive examination of these two exegetes, a few concerns 
about their respective approaches should be raised.²⁹
Goodman complains that the interpretation that makes Avicenna a deter-
minist rests on an equivocation of the key notion of necessity.³⁰ Goodman rightly 
notes that Avicenna distinguishes between, on the one hand, absolute or intrinsic 
necessity, namely, the necessity attributable to God, and relational or conditional 
necessity, on the other hand, that is, the necessity that belongs to an effect given 
the presence of its cause. Goodman further claims that, as the entities and events 
of the created order are not absolutely or intrinsically necessary but only neces-
sary relative to their causes, they are contingent. “Such necessities are a matter of 
logic,” writes Goodman, “but that very fact is sufficient to reveal that they obtain 
only in a context where the proper relations have been stipulated.”³¹ Goodman 
apparently likens Avicennan causal necessitation to modern logical necessity as 
presumably found in, for instance, material implication and such inferences as 
modus ponens, where the link between two terms need merely be one of stipula-
tion.
Goodman’s analysis is unfortunately brief and, taken straightforwardly, 
appears inconsistent with Avicenna’s own account of the relation between demon-
strative logic and causal relations as outlined in Kitāb al-Burhān, I.8. In that text, 
Avicenna insists that the necessity to which (demonstrative) logic corresponds 
is the inherent causal relations within the world and that premises true by mere 
stipulation have no place in demonstrative logic precisely because they do not tell 
us anything about the world.³² Thus, Goodman reverses the apparent explanatory 
order of logic and causation that Avicenna defends in Kitāb al-Burhān. In short, 
Goodman’s interpretation as it stands seems itself to rest on an equivocation, but 
in Goodman’s case on the key notion of relational necessity.
Ivry takes a different tack to show that Avicenna’s system permits real con-
tingency.³³ He focuses on Avicenna’s idea of possible existence, and particularly 
29 Both are treated extensively in Belo 2007, 225–28.
30 Goodman 2006, 81.
31 Goodman 2006, 81.
32 See McGinnis 2009, especially Section 1: ‘Demonstrative Knowledge’.
33 Ivry 1984.
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on possibility’s relation to matter, a suggestion that Gardet also hints at in his 
La pensée religieuse d’Avicenne.³⁴ Ivry’s presentation is rich and nuanced but his 
general idea is that Avicenna’s determinism is limited to forms and to matter that 
has received a form. As for matter considered in itself, according to Ivry there is a 
sense that it is “a real principle of being, the source of change and privation/evil, 
unknowable in itself and hence unpredictable in its relation to form.”³⁵ It is pre-
cisely because matter is unpredictable that Ivry thinks that, for Avicenna, there are 
potential existents and future contingent events of which Ivry adds, “The Neces-
sary Existent does not know these in advance, and cannot know them as such.”³⁶
For present purposes, two quick concerns should be raised about Ivry’s 
reading. First, Ivry sees matter as playing a much more positive or active role 
in sub-lunar processes than Avicenna himself countenances. At Physics I.2 Avi-
cenna insists against Aristotle that uninformed matter is wholly inert and neither 
desires new forms nor sheds off old forms.³⁷ Ivry’s vision of Avicennan matter, in 
contrast, seems to embrace this very notion of tending from one form to another.
Second, Avicenna distinguishes between two fundamentally different types 
of causal orders: physical causation and metaphysical causation. Physical causa-
tion involves such physical processes as heating, cooling, drying, moistening, 
drawing near, withdrawing and other means of preparing (isti‘dād) the matter. 
At most, physical causation prepares the matter for the effects of metaphysical 
causation, that is, it predisposes it to receive a perfection or new (species) form. 
As such, metaphysical causation involves the causal relations of immaterial en -
tities, such as the Necessary Existent, the Intellects and human souls. Thus, even 
if Ivry has shown that there is unpredictability at the material or physical level, 
it is too quick to say that there must also be unpredictability at the intellectual 
or psychological level. This point applies to anyone who argues from purported 
unpredictability in the physical realm to freedom in the spiritual realm, which 
Marwan Rashed obliquely suggests in his extremely insightful article “Théodicée 
et Approximation: Avicenna”.³⁸ The issue of freedom, then, requires a discussion 




37 Avicenna 2009, I.2 [21  f.]; also see McGinnis 2012.
38 Rashed’s purpose is to address the problem of reconciling, within Avicenna’s system, divine 
justice and God’s omnipotence, given the presence of evil. In Section II of his article, Rashed 
takes up a passage from Avicenna’s Fī l-kawn wa-l-fasād, dealing with the ancient doctrine of 
eternal return in which Avicenna states that human choices and volitions are dependent upon 
the motion of the heavens. Avicenna notes that if there were eternal return, even our choices and 
volitions would then be wholly determined. The implication of the passage is that humans have 
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The second way of challenging the Standard Interpretation takes up this 
last point, for this approach shifts the discussion from metaphysical and phys-
ical texts to ethical texts. Janssens is perhaps the most ardent exponent of this 
approach. He observes that Avicenna’s comments about moral evil, reforming 
one’s habits and moral responsibility all point to the conclusion that for Avi-
cenna “man has some freedom of choice in developing his moral and intellectual 
capacities.”³⁹ Of course, to show textually that Avicenna is committed to human 
freedom is not so much an argument against the Standard Interpretation as it is 
a statement of the problem: How is one to reconcile Avicenna’s determinism with 
his occasional claims concerning volitional freedom? Moreover, simply to claim 
that Avicenna is a compatibilist is not much of an answer unless one can further 
show that he, in fact, has the philosophical machinery to make sense of some 
form of compatibilism.
It is our hope that in addressing the puzzles that first initiated this study, 
we can better understand Avicenna’s own conceptions of divine freedom and his 
version of compatibilism, which, we contend, while allowing for human freedom 
in principle, is only truly exercised rarely and then only by prophets, sages and 
philosophers. Before turning to these topics, however, we must briefly consider 
Avicenna’s taxonomy of action as well as his account of agency, and particularly 
his conception of final causality.
2 Avicenna’s Theory of Action: An Overview
Within the Neoplatonizing-Aristotelian tradition of medieval Arabic-Islamic 
philosophy, the standard term for ‘act’ is fi‘l.⁴⁰ In the Metaphysics of his Shifāʼ, 
Avicenna says that by fi‘l he means simply, “the occurrence of existence” (ḥusūl 
al-wujūd), which Ṭūsī glosses in his commentary on Avicenna’s Pointers and 
Reminders, as “the occurrence of existence after privation as the result of some 
cause”.⁴¹ Avicenna in turn uses fi‘l (or as often the hendiadys fi‘l wa kamāl, ‘act 
and perfection’, Gk entelekheia) to define motion (ḥaraka), which is his most basic 
freedom of choice, but at the most Avicenna merely hints at this position and Rashed does not 
pursue the issue in depth.
39 Janssens 2006b, 117.
40 For a discussion of fi‘l, see Wisnovsky 2003, Part I, passim. Unfortunately f‘il is a broad 
notion and used to translate no less than three distinct Greek philosophical notions (Gk. ener-
geia, praxis and poiēsis). Hence it easily allows for slippage among its various meanings. When 
necessary to distinguish the precise sense of fi‘l, we include the Greek.
41 Avicenna 2005, IV.2 [5] and Avicenna 1957–1960, V.2, 63.
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term for actions that involve a process. Loosely, one can think of motion as “the 
non-instantaneous emergence of potency into act (fi‘l)”.⁴² Actions and motion, 
in general for ancient and medieval thinkers, are of three basic kinds: natural, 
volitional and forced.⁴³ Avicenna further discriminates non-forced motion on the 
basis of whether the motion is invariant (e.g., fire always rises unless opposed by 
an obstacle) or variant (e.g., humans can move in straight lines or along circular 
paths). Thus Avicenna identifies four non-forced motions: those that result (1) 
from nature (non-volitional/invariant), (2) from a vegetative soul (non-volitional/
variant), (3) from an animal soul (volitional/variant) and (4) from a celestial soul 
(volitional/invariant).
Both natural and volitional actions proceed from an internal principle or 
power, whereas forced action originates from an external agent. In the case of 
natural motions and actions, the internal principle is the nature, and the actions 
follow a single and unvarying course. The paradigmatic example of such a motion 
is that of a stone’s falling toward and remaining at rest at the center of the earth. 
Other examples include water’s cooling, fire’s rising and the like.
The internal principle in the case of volitional actions is the soul (nafs).⁴⁴ 
Avicenna provides two different accounts of volition. In Physics I.5, which is quite 
brief, Avicenna understands volitional actions as those that are “from oneself” 
(‘an dhātiha), which he glosses to mean “not by force”. The phrase may well be 
a variation on Aristotle’s eph’ heautōi, “what is up to oneself”, from the Nico-
machean Ethics, otherwise, it is not obvious how Avicenna understands the dif-
ference between what is by nature and what is by volition, which he is distin-
guishing.
In the Metaphysics, he provides a richer account that is highly reminiscent 
of Plotinian freedom. There Avicenna maintains that volition must (1) proceed 
from the agent’s recognition (ma‘rifa) or understanding (‘ilm) that the agent is 
the cause of the action, (2) the agent is not impeded in its action and (3) the agent 
consents (raḍiya, yarḍa, riḍan) to the action.⁴⁵ Given the context, it is almost 
certain that in the Metaphysics passage, Avicenna is laying out the criteria for 
specifically intellectual volition, and so applicable solely to humans, Intellect 
(that is, angels) and God, and not a more general conception of volition appli-
cable to all animals. Such a suggestion seems demanded given the presence of 
42 Avicenna 1963, Def. 28 [¶57] and Avicenna 2009, II.1 [6]. For Avicenna’s technical definition of 
motion, see Avicenna 2009, Book II.1, and, for analyses, see Hasnawi 2001, 219–55, and McGinnis 
2006, 189–205.
43 Avicenna 2009, I.5 [1–3].
44 Avicenna 1959, I.5, 39  f.
45 Avicenna 2008, I.5 [1].
 Avicenna’s Philosophy of Action and Theory of the Will   173
the Stoic notion of “consent” as well as the Plotinian insistence on intellectual 
activity. (We return to some of these points in the sequel.)
The final class, forced actions, is a catchall. Unlike both natural and voli-
tional motions, which proceed from an internal principle or power, forced motion 
always involves an external agent. Actions, then, are forced if they are contrary to 
nature or one’s will, as, for example, a stone that is thrown upward or a prisoner’s 
remaining in his locked cell.
Closely aligned with Avicenna’s philosophy of action is a theory of causality. 
Avicenna defines ‘principle’, which can stand as the general definition of cause, 
as “anything that already has a completed existence per se (whether from itself 
or from another) and then from which the existence of another thing occurs and 
subsists by it.”⁴⁶ Like Aristotle, Avicenna in his mature works focuses his discus-
sion on the four causes: matter, form, agent and end.⁴⁷
The most important cause for understanding Avicenna’s philosophy of action 
is the final cause.⁴⁸ For Avicenna, every agent acts only for some end (ghāya), 
final cause (gharaḍ) or intention (qaṣd).⁴⁹ In its most abstract sense, “the end 
is that for the sake of which the existence of something different from [the end] 
is realized”, whereas among natural things subject to processes, it “is the thing 
for the sake of which the form occurs in the matter.”⁵⁰ The end, according to Avi-
cenna, always corresponds with some good, whether apparent or real. The good 
might be, for instance, the good of the natural order, which is fulfilled by natural 
actions such as when a stone falls downward toward its natural place; or the good 
might be a ‘cognitive’ or ‘psychological’ good, like some imagined pleasure that 
motivates a volitional action. Moreover, Avicenna insists that the end is the cause 
of the agent’s acting, for Avicenna believes that there is no efficient causality 
without a final cause.⁵¹ Indeed, the end or final cause is for Avicenna the cause of 
the causality of the efficient cause.
It is for this reason that Avicenna believes that ends have a certain mode of 
priority, albeit not temporal priority, with respect to all other causes, namely, 
ends are prior in ‘thingness’ (shayʼīya).⁵² What Avicenna means by ‘prior in thing-
46 Avicenna 1985, ‘Metaphysics’, I.12 [518].
47 Avicenna 1985, ‘Metaphysics’, I.12; Avicenna 2009, I.10, and Avicenna 2005, VI.1.
48 See Wisnovsky 2002, 97–123.
49 See, for instance, Avicenna 2009, I.13  f., and Avicenna 2005, VI.5.
50 Avicenna 2005, VI.1 [2], and Avicenna 2009, I.10 [10].
51 Avicenna 1985, ‘Metaphysics’, I.12 [519  f.]; Avicenna 2009, I.11 [1], and Avicenna 2005, VI.5; 
also see Kafrawi 2007.
52 See Avicenna 1985, ‘Metaphysics’, I.12, and Avicenna 2005, VI.5 [27–30]. For a discussion of 
Avicenna’s conception of ‘thingness’, see Wisnovsky 2000, 181–221.
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ness’ (certainly with respect to volitional actions) is that the final cause or end is 
conceptualized (taṣawwur) in the mind or soul of an agent and therein recognized 
as some good. Only then does the agent act for the concrete realization of that 
end. Inasmuch as an agent must first conceptualize an end, then, the end must 
be in one sense prior.
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, however, later criticizes Avicenna’s conception of final 
causation. He argues that although such a conception might work for cognizing 
agents, it does not work for natural agents and actions, such as a stone’s tending 
downward toward the center.⁵³ Al-Ṭūsī in turn attempts to defend Avicenna’s 
account, perhaps not entirely successfully, by noting that when the nature essen-
tially requires something, as, for example, being in a certain place, the natural 
agent is ordered to that thing as potency is to act. This potency, Ṭūsī tells us, can 
be thought of as a certain prior awareness (shu‘ūr) belonging to the nature.⁵⁴
To finish this brief summary of Avicenna’s theory of causality, for him all 
causes inasmuch as they are causes must co-exist and so exist simultaneously 
with their effects.⁵⁵ In other words, whenever there is a complete causal nexus, 
that complement of causes necessitates the effect. If a given effect does not occur, 
then either one of the necessary causes is absent (for example, the matter is not 
suitably prepared or, in the case of a volitional agent, the will is not present) or 
something is hindering or preventing the cause(s) from acting. This latter sce-
nario (namely, when something is hindering or preventing the cause(s) from 
acting) explains, to Avicenna’s mind, why some effects seem to occur only for the 
most part (fī akthar = Gk. hōs epi to polu) rather than always.⁵⁶ The upshot of this 
last point is that for Avicenna our world is a thoroughly and causally determinis-
tic system, just as the Standard Interpretation has it.
3  Volition, Intentional Action and Choice: 
Divine Freedom
The above provides the broad contours of Avicenna’s philosophy of action, but 
in order to address the interpretative puzzles that initiated this study, we must 
return to and closely examine Avicenna’s understanding of volitional actions. 
Avicenna’s most extensive philosophical treatments of volition occur while dis-
53 Avicenna 1957–1960, IV.7, 18.
54 Avicenna 1957–1960, IV.7, 18.
55 Avicenna 2009, III.11 [2]; Avicenna 2005, VI.2.
56 Avicenna 2009, I.13 [6].
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cussing the divine creative action, namely, emanation (fayaḍān). The details of 
Avicenna’s theory of emanation need not worry us.⁵⁷ What is of interest are two 
interpretive difficulties that Avicenna’s discussion raises: one, how to understand 
Avicenna’s distinction between intention and volition, and, two, how to under-
stand Avicenna’s conception of divine freedom or volition.
These difficulties arise from Avicenna’s steadfast belief that The Necessary 
Existent – that is, Avicenna’s deity – is absolutely simple and thus wholly free 
from composition or multiplicity. Because the Necessary Existent is absolutely 
simple, it is equally impossible, reasons Avicenna, that:
the being of the cosmos should result from [the Necessary Existent] in a way that there is 
some intention (qaṣd) – like our intention – for Its generating the universe and for its [i.e., 
the universe’s] existence such that It intends [Its action] for the sake of something other 
than Itself.⁵⁸
Here, the phrase “for the sake of” is the standard locution indicating a final cause 
or end. Thus one might think that Avicenna’s primary reason for denying that 
the Necessary Existent acts for the sake of the world is that the good of the world 
would be a cause making the divine action an effect. Although this observation 
is certainly true, this is not the reason that Avicenna himself explicitly gives for 
his denial.
The explicit reason why Avicenna rejects the Necessary Existent’s acting 
intentionally and acting for the good of the created order is that so acting would 
embroil the deity in multiplicity and so would jeopardize divine simplicity.⁵⁹ 
Avicenna enumerates the multiplicity thus: (1) there would be something in the 
Ne cessary Existent that is the cause of Its intending, namely, Its knowledge that 
the intention is necessary, desirable or that there is some good in it; (2) there 
would be the act by which the intention is acquired; and finally (3) there would be 
that which is acquired by acting for that intention. All of this Avicenna believes is 
simply absurd, given that the Necessary Existent is absolutely simple.
Concerning that for the sake of which the Necessary Existent creates, through-
out his discussion of volition in his Notes (Ta‘līqāt), Avicenna boldly maintains 
that although the Necessary Existent does indeed act for the sake of an end, that 
end is not the created order itself. Instead, the Necessary Existent desires only 
Itself (Its dhāt) as the end of its action.
57 See Davidson 1992, 74–83, and Janssens 2006a. For a discussion of al-Fārābī’s theory of ema-
nation, which influenced Avicenna’s own, see also Druart 1992.
58 Avicenna 2005; IX.4 [2].
59 Avicenna 2005, IX.4 [1  f.].
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[The Necessary Existent only] desires Itself. Thus, all of these things [in the created order] 
are willed for the sake of (li-ajli)] [the Necessary Existent] Itself; however, their being willed 
for It is not for the sake of some end (gharaḍ), but only for the sake of It Itself because they 
are something requiring [the Necessary Existent] Itself. It, thus, does not will these existing 
things because of [these things themselves, but for Its own sake and because they are some-
thing requiring [the Necessary Existent] Itself.⁶⁰
In this case, the Necessary Existent wills Its own existence as Its proper good. 
By willing Its own existence, however, there is also a concomitant existence, ex -
plains Avicenna, that can be ‘traced back’ (munāsab) to the Necessary Existent’s 
willing Itself.⁶¹ This concomitant existence, claims Avicenna, is the existence of 
the created order. That concomitant created existence, however, is again not the 
end or purpose of the Necessary Existent’s action. It is simply a residual effect, if 
you will, of the divinity’s willing Its own being.
With this brief background in place, one is ready to appreciate the first 
problem that Avicenna’s account of divine action raises: According to Avicenna, 
the Necessary Existent cannot come to possess some new will that It did not have 
from all eternity. That is because, again, the emergence of a new will would in-
troduce multiplicity into the godhead, namely, there would be what possesses 
the new will, the new will itself and the action that issues from that new will. 
In terms of the medieval Islamic debate over the divine attributes, then for Avi-
cenna, God’s will (and indeed all the divine attributes) must be, for all intents 
and purposes, attributes of the essence. In fact in his treatment of the attri butes 
of action (ṣifa fā‘ilīya), Avicenna begins with the absolute simplicity of the Ne ces-
sary Existent, followed by numerous arguments that all of its actions must be 
eternal.⁶² Against this background, one can understand why the mutakallimūn 
complain that Avicenna’s deity acts only by natural necessity as It seemingly can 
act only in one way from all eternity and so has no choice but so to act.
The second interpretive difficulty is closely related to the first: whereas divine 
action is not intentional (bi-l-qaṣd), Avicenna tells us, neither is it a natural 
action. His general reason for denying that the divine action is natural is that, 
as explained above, natural actions are opposed to volitional action. Since Avi-
cenna argues that the divine action has all the hallmark of (intellectual) volitional 
action, it is not an act of nature. Again the Metaphysic’s criteria for volitional 
motion are: (1) that it proceeds from the agent’s recognition (ma‘rifa) or under-
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in its action and (3) the agent consents to the action.⁶³ Therein lies the puzzle: 
According to Avicenna, emanation is neither a natural action nor an intentional 
one, and yet despite not being an intentional action it is supposedly a volitional 
action. To say the least, Avicenna’s intention is a bit obscure and leaves one won-
dering what he means by ‘volition’. Certainly, if one said, “I willed to drink the 
glass of bourbon but I did not intend to do so” the listener would rightly look 
askance at him.
So the questions before us are (1) how to understand the distinction that Avi-
cenna draws between volitional (bi-l-irāda) and intentional (bi-l-qaṣd) actions 
and (2) whether Avicenna’s deity is bound by natural necessity or there is some 
sense that it is a free agent. Let us take up the problem of distinguishing voli-
tional and intentional actions first, which in turn provides some of the material 
for addressing the second problem.
In the Notes, Avicenna again identifies natural and volitional actions, but 
now he focuses primarily upon the cognitive component.⁶⁴ He does not mention 
the “no impediment” condition, but presumably this is taken as a given as the 
explicit issue is the divine will.⁶⁵ In the Notes, he adds that there are three prin-
ciples from which volitional actions proceed: “every action that proceeds from 
a will, the principle of that will is either understanding (‘ilm) or opinion (ẓann) 
or the (compositive) imagination (takhayyul)”.⁶⁶ Indeed the three can be traced 
back to Plato’s famous tripartite division of the soul (Republic, IV, 436b–441c) – 
appetite, sprit and reason – albeit filtered through Aristotle’s discussion of the 
principles of motion for animals (De anima, III.9–11). It is worth noting that in 
both Aristotle’s discussion and Avicenna’s in his Metaphysics (and implicitly in 
his Psychology too), only two motive principles are mentioned: imagination and 
discursive thought (fikr).⁶⁷ The new identification of three principles of volition 
is probably rooted in his need to generalize the discussion of volition so as now 
63 Avicenna 2005, IX.4 [3].
64 Appendix, 17–25.
65 We are aware that there is another way to understand Avicenna’s discussion. The “consen-
sus condition” could simply refer to Aristotle’s condition that a volitional action be unforced. If 
so interpreted, Avicenna’s understanding of volition simply would be that of Aristotle from the 
Nicomachean Ethics, an action is volitional only if it is (1) cognitive and (2) not forced. Although 
we hold open this interpretation, we also want to explore the real possibility that Avicenna is 
addressing the larger Greek commentary tradition concerning the theory of volition as well as 
issues that arise from within his own Islamic intellectual tradition.
66 Appendix, 23–5.
67 See Avicenna 1959, IV.4, where the focus is primarily on imagination but where his exam ples 
of a carpenter or doctor’s actions implies discursive thought. He explicitly mentions both in Avi-
cenna 2005, VI.5 [7  f.].
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to include divine volition, but can also be derived from Avicenna’s own advance-
ments in psychology. To be more explicit on this last point, volitional actions 
have some pleasure or good as their end (gharaḍ). Because, for Avicenna, there 
are three sources by which an agent recognizes some good – through the external 
senses, internal senses⁶⁸ and the intellect – so there must be three principles from 
which volitional actions can proceed.⁶⁹ The compositive imagination recognizes 
sensible goods, which satisfy our appetites, opinion recognizes those goods asso-
ciated with the internal senses and understanding recognizes the goods of the 
intellect.⁷⁰
As in Plotinus’s discussion of “up to us”, Avicenna in the Notes sees an in-
herently passive element in both the case of actions motivated by imagination 
and opinion.
The whole of [what is according to either opinion or imagination] is owing to some end, and 
passivity accompanies [the end], since the end affects what possesses the end and so then 
it is acted on by it.⁷¹
Here it is worth noting that even if Avicenna did not have a translation of Ploti-
nus’s Enneads, VI.8, he would have learned this point from al-Kindī (d. 873), who 
clearly knew the Plotinian text.⁷² The point that all thinkers insist upon is that the 
individual is acted upon by the object of imagination or opinion. In these cases, 
the imagined or opined good associated with the object functions as an end so as 
to initiate one’s motion toward that end. Moreover, by obtaining that good (if it 
is a real good and not merely an apparent good), the agent is thereby improved. 
Thus, for example, being of the opinion that there may be some (future) risk, the 
agent acts in a way to minimize the potential harm and provide for the future. Or, 
again, the agent may imagine how some apparent good might improve or give 
pleasure to the agent and thus (imaginatively) seeing in one’s mind’s eye that 
future possible state, acts so as to realize that imagined good.
68 Aristotle identifies a number of different operations with imagination (De anima, III.3), and 
Avicenna carefully distinguishes these various operations into the internal senses. For a discus-
sion of Avicenna’s doctrine of internal senses, and particularly the compositive imagination, see 
Black 2013.
69 See, for instance, Avicenna 2005, IX.7 [4–9].
70 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helping us with this formulation and pointing 
out the similarities between Avicenna’s discussion and Aristotle’s De anima III.9–11 passage.
71 Appendix, 32–4.
72 See al-Kindī 1998, 169–71. That al-Kindī would have known the relevant passage is strongly 
suggested by the fact that the so-called Theology of Aristotle was translated within the Kindī 
circle, and the Theology itself is a redaction of books IV–VI of the Enneads.
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Here one should observe that the elements of passivity, which Avicenna enu-
merates in acting for some imagined or opined end, are virtually the same that he 
listed in the Metaphysics when explaining why the divinity does not act by inten-
tion: (1) The end or intention, which is not yet concretely possessed, but which 
causally acts upon the agent so as to initiate its action, (2) the action itself, which 
will be a certain process, namely, the actualization of some potential and (3) the 
good or benefit, which is achieved from the action.
Avicenna next turns to actions arising from understanding or causal knowl-
edge (‘ilm). ‘Ilm, within the Arabic philosophical tradition, refers to a deep under-
standing of reality that grasps the very underlying causes and essential features of 
things.⁷³ As an example of volitional actions proceeding from ‘ilm, Avicenna men-
tions the geometer and physician acting according to knowledge of the principles 
of their respective sciences, which give rise to actions in which a right and good 
order is obtained. Unlike imagination or opinion, understanding is not inherently 
passive; nonetheless it can be passive, particularly in the case of human knowl-
edge or understanding (as opposed to divine understanding or knowledge).
To explain this last point more fully, Avicenna observes that when we humans 
will something, the object of imagination, opinion or understanding is first con-
ceptualized.⁷⁴ Now for Avicenna, when we conceptualize (taṣawwur) something, 
x, the essence of x – its ‘thingness’ – can be said to exist mentally within our 
souls or minds, although we do not yet concretely possess x. In certain cases, this 
mental existence engenders a belief (i‘tiqād) that x considered in itself is bene-
ficial or a good that will perfect and complete the individual. This belief that x is 
good or beneficial in turn gives rise to a desire (shawq) in the appetitive faculty 
to acquire x. When the desire is sufficiently strong such that the volitional agent 
actually seeks the (purported) good there is choice (ikhtiyār). Finally, choice sets 
the motor faculty arrayed throughout the muscles in motion so that the human 
moves in such a way as to acquire x.⁷⁵
To repeat quickly, volitional actions arising from understanding are passive 
if any of the following three conditions are met: (1) understanding informs an 
agent of some end that the agent does not possess, (2) that end initiates a physical 
process of actualizing some potential in the agent and (3) through that process 
the agent seeks some beneficial or good thing for itself. These points are again the 
three elements that Avicenna identified with intentional actions in the Metaphys-
73 See Avicenna 1966a, I.7  f.; also see McGinnis 2008, 129–52.
74 Appendix, 39–6 and 105–110.
75 More detailed accounts of this psycho-biological chain, albeit in terms of the faculties of com-
positive imagination and discursive reason (fikr), are given in Avicenna 1959, IV.2, and Avicenna 
2005, VI.5 [3–17].
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ics passage. Call the intellectual volitional principle that realizes these three con-
ditions “passive-type-understanding”. Should none of these three conditions be 
met and yet an agent still act through understanding, then understanding would 
not involve a passive component and so it would be active. Call this latter kind of 
understanding “active-type-understanding”.
We are now in a position to explain Avicenna’s seemingly problematic dis-
tinction between volitional and intentional actions seen earlier in the Metaphys-
ics. Volitional actions in general refer to the genus of actions that are essentially 
not forced but are cognitive and consensual. One species of volitional actions 
involves passivity. As such (1) one’s power of volition must be acted upon by an 
end or intention inasmuch as the end or intention has a prior existence in the soul 
as an object of conceptualization, and as such is a cause of the willing; (2) the 
action resulting from the volition must itself be a process; and (3) there must be 
some (real or apparent) good or benefit that one anticipates to achieve at the end 
of the process, that is to say, the end or good does not already belong to the agent 
essentially. Call this species of volitional actions “intentional actions”. Inten-
tional actions can be further divided into those subspecies that have as a princi-
ple of volition (i) imagination, (ii) opinion and (iii) passive-type-understanding.
Additionally, there is that species of volitional actions that is inherently 
active, that is, it does not involve passivity and so does not involve a process and 
thus does not require seeking some perfection that the agent lacks. Such actions 
have active-type-understanding as their principle of volition, and the end of 
action is not some external good but an internal good, like one’s very being (dhāt) 
as when the Necessary Existent wills Its own being or existence, and there flows 
from that action the concomitant emanation of our world.
Understanding in what sense the divine action is volitional, namely, that it 
does not involve a passive element – that is to say, there is no (external) final 
cause acting upon the deity – goes part of the way in addressing our primary 
question: In what sense, if any, is divine action free and not merely a matter of 
natural necessity? For there can be little doubt that Avicenna’s Necessary Exist-
ent is not impeded in Its action, recognizes that It is acting and consents to that 
action. Thus the divine action is volitional according to Avicenna’s analysis of 
volitional actions, albeit not intentional, that is, an action that involves some 
element of passivity.
Moreover, of the various species of volitional actions that Avicenna counte-
nances in his philosophy of action, the sort of action under which divine action 
falls – namely, one issuing from active understanding – is the best candidate to 
be a free action. It is here, however, that the Mu‘tazilites may object that in fact 
Avicenna’s analysis of volitional action is sufficiently impoverished to preclude 
any action’s being free, for Avicenna does not include choice as an essential com-
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ponent of volitional action. As we saw when discussing the Mu‘tazilites’ notion 
of divine justice, choice (ikhtiyār) was for them an essential element in volition. 
Even the Sunnī orthodox theologian, Māturīdī, had insisted that choice must be 
a part of volition. Thus for these theologians, if some agent has no choice with 
respect to an action, then that action must be necessary, and so is not free and so 
one cannot be held morally responsible for it. The objection moves quickly and, 
to assess its cogency, we must consider the notion of choice that underwrites it.
The Arabic ikhtiyār comes from the root Kh-Y-R, and, like the English word 
‘choice’, this root carries with it not only the idea of ‘to choose’, that is, to have 
options, but also of ‘being choice worthy’, in other words, to be good or excellent, 
as in a choice steak or choice piece of real estate.⁷⁶ In general, Avicenna seems to 
use ikhtiyār most frequently in the latter sense of being directed toward a good, 
although he occasionally uses it in the sense of preferring among options.⁷⁷ So, 
for instance, although Avicenna never appears formally to define choice, as, for 
example, al-Fārābī does,⁷⁸ both senses of choice appear at play in his definition of 
the practical intellect (‘aql ‘amalī) in his Book of Definitions: “The practical intel-
lect is a faculty of the soul that is a principle for the appetitive faculty to produce 
motion toward what is chosen from among the particulars for the sake of some opin-
ioned or understood end”.⁷⁹ Here one sees the sense of choosing since something 
is good because, as seen earlier, ends are real or apparent goods. Additionally, 
the sense of choosing from among options is seen in Avicenna’s ikhtiyār min (“to 
choose from among”) construction. (Admittedly this construction may well have 
been “loose talk” on Avicenna’s part, for, as we saw, the notion of options played 
no explicit role in Avicenna’s analysis of volition.)⁸⁰ Call these different nuances of 
choice “choiceo” (with respect to options) and “choiceg” (with respect to the good).
As for choiceg, namely, a choice made on the basis of some anticipated good, 
Avicenna notes that it is intimately linked to seeking (ṭalab) some imagined, 
76 See Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, s.v. kh-y-r. The root sense is to become possessed of some 
good (khayr), from which is derived the idea of choosing what is good.
77 See Goichon 1938, s.v. ‘ikhtiyār’.
78 Al-Fārābī 1985, 204, 9–11: “The tendency to what one perceives, in general, is volition. So, if 
that [tendency] results from sensation and imagination it goes by the name ‘volition’, whereas 
if that results from deliberation and reason, it is called ‘choice’. The latter is proper to humans.”
79 Avicenna 1963, ¶ 22.
80 Interestingly, choice as including options does appear in Aristotle’s definition of prohaeresis 
(=ikhtiyār) in the Arabic translation of the Nicomachean Ethics. “[Choice] seems to be a volun-
tary action, except that not all that is voluntary is chosen. Instead, what is chosen is that which 
deliberation necessitates (mā awjabat al-rawīya), because choice is only through discrimination 
and the intellect. It appears that the term ‘choice’ in our language indicates that which gives 
preference to one thing over another” (Aristotle 2005, III.2 [16  f.]).
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opined or intellectual good.⁸¹ The Arabic ṭalab, which is central to choiceg, 
conveys the sense not only of seeking but also of wanting or requiring. In general, 
then, the idea is that choiceg involves some lack or absence of a proper good – 
that is, something that the agent is in want of – that the object sought fulfills. It 
is important to note that choiceg, again in the sense of choice worthy, arises only 
insofar as the agent possesses what Avicenna is calling a passive element, which 
corresponds with a certain potential to be set in motion.
This analysis provides an immediate reason why Avicenna would exclude 
choiceg from his account of volitional action. Since choiceg involves an inherent 
passive element, if it were essential to volitional actions, the active-type-voli-
tional actions, which Avicenna’s analysis suggested, would be impossible; for 
their defining trait is that they do not involve a passive element. The very fact that 
active-type-volitional actions at least appear to be among the logical possibilities 
that a theory of action would want to consider gives one a reason to omit choiceg 
from the list of necessary desiderata for a general theory of volition or at least 
seriously to qualify what is meant by ‘choice’.
Whereas the above is sufficient to understand Avicenna’s hesitancy to 
include choice as a necessary part of volitional actions, there is another possi-
ble reason as well, which has its roots in Plotinus. This second reason exploits 
the idea seen above, that choice is believed to require options or alternatives. If 
volitional actions require choiceo, then, for an agent to choose, the agent must be 
aware of the various options before it, and these options represent various goods 
conceived in the intellect of the choosing agent. From a monotheistic point of 
view, however, this analysis raises by now a familiar theological difficulty. If the 
divinity must recognize two distinct goods from which to choose, the divine mind 
must be a composite of at least two concepts corresponding with the two goods, 
and so would not be absolutely simple. Consequently, Avicenna may have ex-
cluded choice from his preferred list of essential elements for a volitional action 
because he wanted to ensure that divine action is volitional, while also safe-
guarding divine simplicity (tawḥīd).
Concerns such as these clearly motivated Neoplatonic discussions of will and 
the One. For Neoplatonists, what emanates from the One does so as a matter of 
necessity precisely because the emanation flows from the One because the One 
is necessarily and essentially good.⁸² For the One not to emanate and so not to 
create would be for it not to be Good and so for it simply not to be. Avicenna, likely 
81 Avicenna 2005, IX.2 [12].
82 While this might not be the position of Plotinus in Enneads VI.8 (see Frede 2012, Ch. 8, esp. 
145–52), it does seem to be the position of Proclus (see Proclus 2001, Argument I).
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knew Plotinus’s position on this point. Hence these Plotinian concerns may well 
be at play in Avicenna’s omission of choice in his account of volitional actions. 
Call this reading of Avicenna the ‘Plotinian Interpretation’.⁸³ Of course, the Plo-
tinian Interpretation seems to land Avicenna in the original puzzle: “Does not 
God create as a matter of natural necessity given what it is?”
This ‘Plotinian Interpretation’ is not the only way to read Avicenna on this 
point. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, in his commentary on Avicenna’s Pointers and Remind-
ers, rejects the claim that Avicenna’s Necessary Existent creates of necessity.⁸⁴ In 
contrast, Ṭūsī endorses the position that the deity in fact creates by choice (ikhti-
yār). The context of Ṭūsī’s claim is in response to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s charge that 
“the philosophers were in agreement that the eternal cannot be the act of a choos-
ing agent (fā‘il mukhtār)”, and so the divine action must be necessary.⁸⁵
Ṭūsī’s response moves in two stages: (1) clarify what the philosophers truly 
maintain and (2) show that in principle the philosophers’ position is no differ-
ent from that of the theologians. To the first point, what the philosophers in 
fact affirm, Ṭūsī tells us, is that an eternal agent complete in its agency cannot 
but produce an eternal effect.⁸⁶ Such a claim, however, means that the Neces-
sary Existent cannot produce a temporal effect, such as a cosmos that began, for 
instance, 10,000 years ago. So it is true that, for the philosophers, an eternal cause 
complete in its agency cannot choose to create a temporal effect. It is, however, 
false that such an agent cannot choose absolutely, insists Ṭūsī, for there is still 
open to it the option of choosing either to create (eternally) or not to create (at all).
Second, continues Ṭūsī, this situation in principle is no different from that 
of the mutakallimūn, for they first establish that the cosmos must necessarily be 
something temporally created. Moreover, in their proof for the temporal creation 
of the cosmos, they never say a word about the cosmos’ agent, let alone that its 
agent chooses. Consequently, concludes Ṭūsī, the theologians equally deny that 
God chooses, for according to their position, God cannot create an eternally exist-
ing world but only chooses when to create a temporally generated world. Avi-
cenna and the theologians’ positions are in principle the same. In short, Ṭūsī’s 
criticism of Rāzī, comes down to the old adage: What is good for the (theological) 
goose is good for the (philosophical) gander. Call this reading the ‘Naṣirean Inter-
pretation’ of Avicenna.
This Naṣirean Interpretation actually has a textual basis in Avicenna’s own 
discussion of liberality (jūd) from the Metaphysics of the Cure. In the relevant 
83 This is the conclusion of Kafrawi 2007, esp. 187.
84 Avicenna 1957–1960, V.3.
85 Cited in Avicenna 1957–1960, V.3, 69.
86 Avicenna 1957–1960, V.3, 70.
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passage, Avicenna treats an agent that is absolutely perfect with no deficiency 
who provides some good to another, neither desiring, needing nor expecting 
any good from that other in return. Clearly the agent in question is the Necessary 
Exist ent, and Avicenna has this to say of It:
The procession of that thing [i.e., good] from it [i.e., the Necessary Existent] to the other is 
such that its being from it or not being from it are on par. [This is] to the point that even if that 
good, which is good relative to the other, were not to proceed from it, [that agent’s] states 
would be the same in every respect as if that [good] had proceeded from it […] and to the 
point that even if [that agent] did not bring that [good] into actuality (lam yuf‘al), it would 
not quit being the most worthy and the best.⁸⁷
While the language of choice does not appear in Avicenna’s discussion, the two 
options of choice that Ṭūsī identified clearly do. In this text, Avicenna, it would 
seem, is modifying the original Neoplatonic position.
Again the Plotinian Interpretation is predicated on the assumption that not 
creating would somehow lessen the goodness of the deity or, stated in another 
way, the goodness of God plus the goodness of creation is a greater or a more com-
plete good than merely the goodness of God alone. Fleshing out Avicenna and 
Ṭūsī’s point, the goodness of God is infinite, whereas the goodness of creation is 
only a finite good. To add or subtract a finite to or from the infinite, however, in no 
way enhances or diminishes the infinite. It is still infinite. In like manner, whether 
the Necessary Existence creates or does not create, so acting (or not acting) in no 
way increases nor lessens the divine goodness. It is still infinitely good.
Moreover, divine simplicity is safeguarded, for creating or not creating do 
not correspond to two distinct concepts in the divine mind. Not creating simply 
is the negation or absence of the idea of creating. In other words, the options for 
the divinity are not between distinct types of action, which would require distinct 
concepts, as, for example, choosing between either reading a book or going to 
a movie. Instead the only thing that Necessary Existing knows, and to which It 
consents in either the case of creating or not creating, is the essential goodness 
that is the very divine being itself.
In general, [the Necessary Existent] does not know the concomitants of Itself – I mean the 
objects of understanding – and then thereafter consents to them; rather, since their proces-
sion is from what [the Necessary Existent] Itself requires [namely, Its own goodness], their 
very procession from It is itself Its consenting to them.⁸⁸
87 Avicenna 2005, VI.5 [44]. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention 
to the significance of this passage for the Naṣirean Interpretation.
88 Appendix, 61–4.
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The object of the divine intellect is the divinity itself. Whether the cosmos exists 
or not, that object does not change. Thus explicitly for Ṭūsī and implicitly for 
Avicenna, the Necessary Existent chooses in the sense that It has the option of 
whether to create or not to create, and yet whether it creates or not in no way 
diminishes its goodness or jeopardizes its simplicity.
4  Causal Determinism and Moral Responsibility: 
the Human Will
We now turn to the second of the interpretive puzzles that initiated this study, 
namely, how is one to reconcile the seemingly strong causal determinism of 
Avicenna’s physics and metaphysics with his claims that humans are morally 
responsible for their actions. If humans do have free will for Avicenna, then it 
would have to proceed from an active-type understanding. Unfortunately, it is not 
immediately clear whether Avicenna thought that volitional action of the inher-
ently active kind could be ascribed to humans. If so, it would almost certainly be 
rare; it would be a self-referential or self-identifying, even perhaps a self-forming, 
act for the individual.
In contrast, there is no doubt that Avicenna viewed the vast majority of, if 
not all, human volitional actions as intentional. Intentional actions are, again, 
inherently passive. As such they are fully determined by a combination of ex -
ternal causes and internal corporal psychological faculties or powers. Admittedly, 
Avicenna concedes, it is difficult, in the case of volitional actions, to identify all 
of the causal constituents, “for volition is incited to act [only] after a number of 
factors are fulfilled, the enumeration of which is not easy.”⁸⁹ Still, he is clear that 
the overwhelming majority of, if not all of, our volitional acts are causally deter-
mined in some sense. For, as Avicenna writes:
The volitions that belong to us come to be after not having been, and whatever comes to 
be after not having been has a cause. Thus our volition has a cause and the cause of that 
volition will not be an infinite series of volitions, but things that happen externally, whether 
earthly or heavenly, with the earthly terminating in the heavenly.⁹⁰
89 Avicenna 2009, I.14 [5].
90 Avicenna 2005, X.1, [12].
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Thus, it would certainly seem from this passage and others that our actions are 
fully determined by finite series of physical causes, whether those causes are of a 
terrestrial or celestial nature.
Avicenna’s strong affirmation that intentional actions are causally deter-
mined, however, must be assessed against his views on moral responsibility and 
freedom found in his occasional, indeed somewhat rare, discussions of ethics.⁹¹ 
Unfortunately, in the work where he should seemingly treat these issues, The 
Essay on the Secret of Destiny, he unhelpfully states that whereas God wholly 
determines our actions, we are in some sense still responsible for those actions.⁹² 
He is more forthcoming in his short treatise, On the Science of Ethics (Fī ‘ilm 
al-akhlāq). For our topic, what is important in that work is his discussion of how 
humans acquire virtues (as well as vices). Like Aristotle, Avicenna too thinks that 
virtues and vices are acquired through habituation (i‘tiyād), namely, by perform-
ing a certain class of actions repeatedly over a long period of time. As for acquir-
ing these moral habits, Avicenna thinks that humans are capable of initiating 
new processes of habituation. “Whenever some human does not actually have 
a certain moral character, he can attain it for himself”, Avicenna writes, “and 
likewise whenever he happens to find himself actually having some moral char-
acter, he can, through an act of his volition (bi-irādatihi), turn toward the contrary 
of that moral character.”⁹³ Moreover, Avicenna states that the object of volition 
(murād) when it aims at the mean, and so at virtue, is freedom (barāʼa; probably 
= Gk. to eleutheron) and mastery (isti‘lāʼ; probably = Gk. to kyrios), particularly 
freedom from and mastery over the conditions of one’s natural temperament.⁹⁴ 
The language certainly harkens back to both Alexander’s and Plotinus’s own lan-
guage on the subject as well as strongly suggests that Avicenna thought that we 
are morally responsible for our own habituation and actions, and so perhaps in 
some sense that we are free. The issue, then, is whether he can consistently hold 
this position given his strong notion of causal determinism.
Concerning whether Avicenna can give a consistent account of moral respon-
sibility, we start with something of a bold conjecture. Given many of the deep 
structural similarities between Plotinus’s own treatment of volition and the One 
from Enneads, VI.8, and Avicenna’s own account of volition in the Notes, we 
91 See, for example, Avicenna 2005, IX.7–X.5, Avicenna 1957–1960, VIII–X, and Avicenna 1986.
92 See Avicenna 1966b. That work lists three premises necessary for understanding the deter-
mination (qadar) of our actions, (1) that God causally determines everything in our world, (2) that 
we should understand reward and punishment in the afterlife and finally (3) that there is indeed 
an afterlife with rewards and punishment seemingly determined by our actions here and now.
93 Avicenna 1986, 120.
94 Avicenna 1986, 123.
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tentatively suggest that Avicenna views the account of volition developed in the 
Notes as equally applicable to humans, albeit in an inferior way, just as Plotinus 
had done before him.
Recall then that in the Notes, Avicenna introduced a notion of “traced back” 
(munāsab) to show that, even though the Necessary Existent gained no benefit 
from creation, It was still responsible for creation because creation is traced 
back to It and It recognizes and consents to the world’s creation.⁹⁵ Although it 
would be impossible to say with certainty, it is reasonable to think that Avicen-
na’s notion of “traced back” is his attempt to capture the ancient notion of “up 
to oneself”. If, then, Avicenna is following Plotinus, Avicenna could apply this 
same schema to the case of human moral responsibility. Consequently, by Avi-
cenna’s analysis, one would be morally responsible for some action, even though 
that action is completely causally determined, just in case: (1) the action is traced 
back to the individual as its agent – that is, the action results from principles 
inherent in the agent of which at least one of those principles will be imagina-
tion, opinion or understanding (whether it be of the passive-type-understand-
ing or active-type-understanding variety) and nothing external hinders the agent 
from so acting – (2) the individual recognizes that he or she is the agent of the act 
and (3) the individual consents to the action. This in effect is the interpretation 
of moral responsibility that Hourani, in his analysis of The Essay on the Secret of 
Destiny, ascribes to Avicenna. As we noted, if this is all Avicenna has to say on 
the subject, then it would have been greeted with only limited success within its 
historical context, given the debates between Alexander and the Stoics as well as 
among the mutakallimūn.
Thus taking seriously the Greek and Islamic debates surrounding freedom 
and choice, the question we raise is: might Avicenna have countenanced any-
thing analogous to the Naṣirean Interpretation of divine freedom for humans, 
albeit, significantly inferior to that of divine freedom? Such a position would have 
to allow for humans in principle to have an option to choose whether to will or 
not to will in some, perhaps extremely limited, cases, and yet be compatible with 
Avicenna’s deterministic system.
If Avicenna does have such a conception of human free will, then the para-
digm case of such freedom would be the divine creative act. The divine creative 
action, recall, involves the divinity’s willing Itself (dhāt) as Its own proper good, 
which has as its principle the Necessary Existent’s own active-type-understand-
ing of Itself as its end, with creation resulting not as some good desired by the 
95 Appendix, 65–8.
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Necessary Existent but as a concomitant that can be traced back to the deity’s 
willing Itself.
Analogously, human freedom would involve the soul’s willing its own essen-
tial good as a result of active-type-understanding. Now according to Avicenna’s 
psychology, there is a real sense that the human is essentially an immaterial sub-
stance. Hence, there is an equally real sense that the human is essentially his or 
her intellect, for to be immaterial is to be an intellect.⁹⁶ Additionally, the proper 
perfection and end of an intellect is, for Avicenna, understanding (‘ilm), what he 
also calls intellectual perception. For Avicenna, all forms of perception involve 
some proper pleasure, and thus intellectual perception also has an associated 
intellectual pleasure, and so is some good.⁹⁷ Unfortunately, bemoans Avicenna, 
this pleasure is best experienced only in a disembodied state. Still, he asserts, 
some humans do get a faint taste of this intellectual pleasure in the here and now. 
Some of these, namely, prophets, sages and true philosophers, pursue under-
standing and so perfect their very selves as intellects, whereas others who have 
had a glimpse of their true selves forget (yansá) what they are, namely that they 
are an immaterial substance, and because of their forgetfulness pursue the pleas-
ures of the body.⁹⁸ Avicenna reserves the deepest rings of hell for those who have 
had this recognition of their true selves and the concomitant intellectual good 
and pleasures and yet forget what their true selves are. Thus a few words seem 
warranted about this Platonic notion of forgetting our true selves.
We begin with a question: Why does one forget something? The simplest 
answer is that one stops attending to or being aware of that thing because some-
thing else has come up that preoccupies the mind. Avicenna agrees. Humans can 
become so preoccupied with the body and the goods associated with it that they 
cease being aware of what they really are, namely, an immaterial intellect, and of 
their intellectual good. In this case, they no longer include the good of their true 
selves in their deliberations and so that good plays no role in the causal series 
that makes up their lives. Instead, they will and act based upon those passive 
volitional principles over which they have no control and mastery. It is, then, in 
Avicenna’s notion of attending or being aware of one’s true self (shu‘ūr bi-dhāt) 
that we catch a glimmer of choiceo in Avicenna’s account of human volition.⁹⁹ 
As long as one chooses to be actively aware of one’s true self and its good, and 
96 Avicenna 1959, V.2. This point is the goal of Avicenna’s discussion of the ‘true account of the 
soul’ and his famous ‘floating man’ argument; see, for instance, Avicenna 1959, V.7, 252–7.
97 Avicenna 2005, IX.7 [4–15].
98 Avicenna 2005, IX.7 [16].
99 For discussions of Avicenna on self-awareness, see Black 2008, 63–87 and 2007, especially 
Chapters 4 and 5.
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so does not forget oneself, there is true human freedom. In contrast, when one 
forgets oneself, and so chooses not to be actively aware of what one truly is, one 
ceases to have mastery and control over the causal nexus that makes up one’s life.
Two further subsidiary points should be made about Avicenna’s vision of 
human self-awareness and the process that it initiates. First, for Avicenna, there 
is an element of the divine in active self-awareness. Thus Avicenna writes in his 
Psychology, when “the soul conceptualizes itself […] [it] makes itself an intellect, 
something that intellects and something that is intellected.”¹⁰⁰ In other words, in 
active self-awareness the human intellect becomes thought thinking itself, the very 
description Avicenna uses for the divine. Second, this self-awareness can initiate, 
as a concomitant action, a process of scientific inquiry, namely, an exploration into 
the causal structure of the world. In one place, Avicenna describes this inquiry into 
the Cause of the world as, in its purest sense, the contemplation of God and thus 
becoming like God (taʼalluh).¹⁰¹ While this process of inquiry is not the proper end 
of one’s self-awareness (becoming like God is), this process can be traced back to 
the agent’s willing his or her own proper perfection qua intellectual substance.
The foregoing is certainly speculative (and more must be said), but if correct, 
then Avicenna may well have the wherewithal to provide an account of human 
freedom analogous although inferior to the notion of divine freedom suggested 
by Ṭūsī, albeit, a freedom exercized only by the rare few – perhaps only prophets 
and sages. For in the action noted, there is a self-realization (or at least the initi-
ation of a process of self-realization) that has as its principle active-type-under-
standing and from which certain concomitant actions result. As such, it mirrors 
(admittedly imperfectly) the divine creative act.
To conclude, there may not be anything surprising in a medieval thinker’s 
setting up divine contemplation as the proper perfection of humans, or even that 
only in contemplating the divine are one’s actions free. What is perhaps surpris-
ing, is that Avicenna had a fairly well-developed theory of action, and how well 
he integrated his conclusions into that theory. What we hopefully have done here 
is to take a first exploratory look at Avicenna’s philosophy of action, and shown 
how it begins to provide answers to two long-standing interpretive puzzles in Avi-
cennan scholarship.
100 Avicenna 1959, V.6 [239].
101 Avicenna 2005, X.4 [7].
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Appendix: “Explaining Will (irāda)” – 
from Avicenna’s Ta‛līqāt¹⁰²
[11] All existing things proceed from [the Necessary Existent] Itself (dhātihī), namely, they 
are something requiring [the Necessary Existent] Itself. So they are not something It seeks, 
because It [only] desires Itself. Thus, all of these things are willed for the sake of (li-ajli)] [the 
Necessary Existent] Itself; however, their being willed for It is not for the sake of some end 
(gharaḍ), but only for the sake of It Itself because they are something requiring [the Neces-
sary Existent] Itself. It, thus, does not will these existing things because of them themselves, 
but for Its own sake and because they are something requiring [the Necessary Existent] 
Itself. An example would be if you desired something, and so all that proceeds from it would 
be an object of desire for you for the sake of that very thing. We will something only for 
the sake of some appetite or pleasure, not for the sake of the very thing desired. Now were 
appetite, pleasure or the like among the things that are self aware [12] (volition belonging 
only to something that is self aware) and [if] the procession of the acts were from [the acts] 
themselves, [the acts] would will those things for their own sake because they proceed from 
themselves.
Next, whatever proceeds from the agent is either essential or accidental. What is essential 
is either natural or volitional. Now any action that proceeds from understanding (‘ilm)¹⁰³ is 
neither by nature nor natural, and so consequently [every action that proceeds from under-
standing] is volitional. Now every action that proceeds from an agent – where the agent 
recognizes (ma‘rifa) the procession of [the action] from him and recognizes that he is its 
agent – that action proceeds from his understanding. Also, every action that proceeds from 
a will, the principle of that will is either understanding (‘ilm) or opinion (ẓann) or the (com-
positive) imagination (takhayyul). An example of what proceeds from understanding is the 
action of the geometer or physician. An example of what proceeds from opinion is being 
cautious of that in which there is risk, while an example of what proceeds from imagination 
is seeking something that appears to be either noble or excellent in order that a likeness 
to the noble or excellent thing is obtained. It is simply not the case that the action of the 
Necessary Existent should be according to either opinion or imagination. [That is] because 
the whole of that [namely, what is according to either opinion or imagination] is owing to 
some end, and passivity accompanies [the end], as the end affects what possesses [13] the 
end and so then it is acted on by it. The Necessary Existent through Itself, however, is nec-
essary in all respects. So if a given end comes to be from It, then there is no respect that the 
Necessary Existent through Itself is acted upon by the end. Therefore, Its willing must be of 
the understanding variety.
Here we really need to distinguish the idea of will. When we ourselves will something, we 
conceptualize that thing in the manner of opinion or imagination or understanding, where 
102 We took as our base text Seyyed Hossein Mousavian’s edition of al-Ta‘līqāt (Avicenna 2013), 
11–17.
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that conceptualized thing is in fact agreeable in the sense that it is excellent or beneficial. 
There then follows upon this conceptualization and belief a desire for it and a desire to 
acquire it. So when the desire and resolve are strong, the power that is in the muscles moves 
the body to acquire it, and for this reason, our actions follow because of the end.
Now we have already explained that the Necessary Existent is complete – indeed above 
completion – so it is simply not the case that Its action should be for the sake of some end. 
Hence, neither is it the case that It should understand that something would be agreeable 
for It so that It would yearn for it and then thereafter acquire it. Its will, with respect to 
understanding, then, is that It understands that that thing in itself is good and excellent, 
[14] and the existence of that [thing the Necessary Existent understands] must in some way 
be such that it is a superior existence where that thing’s coming to be (kawn)¹⁰⁴ is better 
than its not coming to be.¹⁰⁵ So for the thing to exist, there is no other will needed beyond 
this [divine] understanding. In fact, [the Necessary Existent’s] very understanding of the 
order of possible things according to the superior arrangement is a cause necessitating the 
existence of those things according to the existing order and superior arrangement.
In general, [the Necessary Existent] does not know the concomitants of Itself – I mean the 
objects of understanding – and then thereafter consents to them; rather, as their procession 
is from what [the Necessary Existent] Itself requires, their very procession from It is itself Its 
consenting to them. Consequently, their procession from It is not something beneficial for 
Its own sake, but is something traced back (munāsab) to the agent itself. Whatever is not 
beneficial and yet the agent understands that he is its agent is something [the agent] wills 
because it is traced back to him.
Hence we say that these objects of understanding proceed from something requiring the 
very being of the Necessary Existent through Itself (dhāt wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi) – [It 
Itself] being what is desired by It – together with an understanding of It that It is their agent 
and cause. Whatever proceeds from something according to this description is not some-
thing beneficial to that agent. Every action that proceeds from an agent and is not useful 
to him is something he willed. Consequently, all things are willed owing to the Necessary 
Existent, [15] and this willed thing is not the end because the end with respect to Its con-
senting to the procession of those things from It is that It requires Itself as what It desires. 
So Its consenting to those things is for the sake of Itself, which is the final cause (ghāya) of 
the action itself of [the Necessary Existent]. An example of this is when you love something 
for the sake of some person, the object of love in fact is that person, and so therefore the 
absolute object of desire is [the person] himself. An example of will in us is that we will 
something and long for it because we need it, while the Necessary Existent wills it in the 
aforementioned way and yet does not yearn for it because It has no need for it.
So there is no end except together with a desire, for it is said, “Why did he seek this?” and 
then it said, “Because of his yearning”. Where there is no desire, there is no end. In that 
case, then, there is no end in acquiring what is conceptualized. There is no end in what 
follows upon the acquisition of it, as the acquisition of the thing is an end, and whatever 
benefit that follows upon that acquisition is also an end. [16] Sometimes the final cause 
is the action itself, whereas sometimes it is the benefit that follows upon the action. An 
104 Or “the being of that thing”.
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example is going for a walk, which might [itself] be a final cause, but getting exercise might 
[also] be a final cause, and likewise, building might be an end as well as shelter.
Were it that a person recognized the perfection that is the true nature of the Necessary 
Exist ent and thereafter organized the states of affairs that are after It according to Its model 
(mithāl) such that the state of affairs is according to the utmost degree of organization, then 
the end would in fact be the Necessary Existent Itself, which is the perfection. So if the 
Necessary Existent Itself is the agent, then It is also the final cause and end. Likewise, if 
we recognized, for instance, the perfection in some building that we are going to build and 
thereafter arranged the states of affairs of that building according to the requirements of 
that perfection, then that perfection is the end. When that perfection is the agent, the agent 
and end are one. An example of this will in us is when we conceptualize something and 
recognize that it is beneficial or proper, and then this belief and conceptualization moves 
the appetitive power. Unless there is a preponderance and as long there is no obstacle, then 
between the aforementioned conceptualization and belief and between the motion of appe-
titive power there is no other will except this belief itself.
The will of the Necessary Existent is similar. [17] Indeed the intelligibility of things for It is 
according to the way that we indicated, namely, it is the cause of the existence of things, 
since it does not need to desire what It intellects and seek to acquire it. We ourselves need 
only the appetitive power and the will to desire in order that through (bodily) instruments 
(ālāt) we seek what is agreeable to us; for the action of the (bodily) instruments follow upon 
a desire that precedes [that action]. In the case where there is no need for this desire and the 
use of (bodily) instruments, there is only understanding pure and simple of the organiza-
tion of the existents. It understands the most superior ways according to which the existents 
must be, and It understands the excellence of the arrangements.
This is the final cause itself, for if we were to arrange something as an existent, we would 
first intellect the superior order and thereafter arrange the existents that we will into exist-
ence according to that superior order and what it requires. So when the order and the per-
fection are itself the agent and thereafter the procession of existing things is from what [the 
agent] requires, then providence is really occurring there, namely, it is the will itself, where 
the will itself is the understanding. The reason for that is that the agent and final cause is 
one thing.
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